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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The 1985 amendment to Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-31 w a s
merely remedial or procedural.

not

It increased by ten-fold the

amount defendants were required to pay to prevent foreclosure on
the subject real property.

The change was substantive, and the

trial court's application of the 1985 amendment to the subject
trust deed unconstitutionally impaired the contract.
The trust deed, which was executed

prior to the 1985

amendments, gave the creditor the option to "foreclose this
Trust Deed in the manner provided by law for the foreclosure of

mortgages on real property,"

This provision incorporated the

law of foreclosure as it existed when the trust deed was signed.
Even if the 1985 amendment does govern this case, plaintiff
did not irrevocably elect to proceed by judicial foreclosure
until it filed its complaint herein, which was after defendants
had tendered payment of the delinquency.

Because plaintiff had

not made an irrevocable election, defendants were still entitled
to cure the delinquency as provided in the trust deed statutes.
Defendants' tender of the delinquency was adequate as a matter
of law, because Darrell D. Tanner testified, without contradiction, that he had the ability to cause The Ridge Athletic Club,
Inc., to pay the delinquency on the date of the tender.
Finally, plaintiff is not entitled to a security interest
in new equipment and other personal property placed on the
subject real property by The Ridge Athletic Club, Inc., an
entity which did

not sign any

documents with plaintiff.

security

agreement

or other

The plaintiff's security interest

extends only to personal property owned or acquired by Sherwood
Associates.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE 1985 AMENDMENT TO UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-31
AFFECTED SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS.
Plaintiff correctly argues that statutory amendments which
affect only remedies or procedures, but which do not affect
substantive rights, may be applied to contracts executed prior
2

to the effective date of the amendment.

The amendment at issue

in this case is not, however, merely remedial or procedural.
The cases cited by plaintiff are distinguishable and can be
generally explained as exercises of police power.

Retroactive

application of the 1985 amendment cannot be justified under the
constitutional

analysis

set

forth

in

recent

United

States

Supreme Court decisions and decision of other states.
Plaintiff relies heavily on the United States Supreme Court
case of Home Building and Loan Assfn v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398
(1934), which upheld a Minnesota mortgage moratorium law passed
in response to the Great Depression of the 1930fs, and on other
cases of a similar vintage.

The cases are distinguishable and

not applicable to the present situation in Utah.

,f

[I]t is now

recognized that the court's holding in Blaisdell was based on
the emergency which then existed."
Landry, 372 A.2d 573, 576 (Me. 1977).

Portland Savings Bank v.
The court in Blaisdell

upheld the Minnesota act only because it met five criteria
related to the emergency:
Upholding the constitutionality of the
Minnesota act, the court identified five
criteria by which a legislative enactment
could survive a challenge based on impairment of contract: (1) an emergency created
a need for the measure; (2) the legislation
was addressed to a legitimate public purpose
and not for the mere advantage of particular
individuals; (3) the relief afforded was
appropriate to the emergency; (4) the
conditions imposed by the act were reasonable; and (5) the statute was temporary and
limited to the exigency which called it
forth.

3

Federal Land Bank of Omaha v. Arnold, 426 N.W.2d 153, 159 (Iowa
1988) (citing Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 444-47).
Recent pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court
have refined the balancing test established in Blaisdell to a
three-step analysis:
In the years since Blaisdell and
Worthen.l the United States Supreme Court
has refined the test for contract clause
challenges to a 3-step analysis: (1) if the
state law operates as a substantial impairment of a contractual relationship, (2) the
state must have a significant and legitimate
public purpose behind the regulation, which
(3) adjusts the contracting parties1 rights
and responsibilities based on reasonable
conditions
appropriate
to
the
public
purpose.
Federal Land Bank of Omaha v. Arnold, 426 N.W.2d 153, 159 (Iowa
1988)

(citing Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power &

Light Company, 459 U.S. 400, 411-12 (1983)).
Application of these criteria to the statute at issue in
the instant case establishes that it may not constitutionally be
applied to contracts executed before the effective date of the
1985 amendment.

First, the amendment does operate* as a substan-

tial impairment of Darrell Tanner's rights.
the

amendment, defendants

approximately
foreclosure.

$119,200.00
(R. 352.)

would
to

have

cure

If the

the

been

In the absence of
required

default

1985 amendment

and

to pay
prevent

is applied,

however, the amount necessary to forestall foreclosure would
1

W. D. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U. S. 56 (1935), a
case which found unconstitutional an Arkansas statute which
dramatically changed the terms by which the payment of special
assessments on municipal bonds were enforced.
4

have been approximately
nearly ten-fold

$1,118,984.90.

(R. 353-54.)

This

increase in the amount necessary to prevent

foreclosure is clearly a substantial and substantive change.
Second, there is no evidence that the State of Utah had any
"significant and legitimate public purpose" for giving retroactive effect to such a substantive modification, and indeed there
is no evidence that the legislature intended the statute to have
retroactive effect.
Third, even if there were some significant public purpose,
there is no indication that the 1985 amendment "adjusts the
contracting

parties1

rights

and

responsibilities

based

on

reasonable conditions appropriate to the public purpose."
Application of these principles have been illustrated in
other cases more factually similar to the case at bar.

In

Portland Savings Bank v. Landry, 372 A.2d 573 (Me. 1977), for
example, the court considered a statute which reduced to 90 days
the period for redemption after a foreclosure sale, whereas the
redemption

period

had

previously

been

one

year.

Although

application of the arguments espoused by plaintiff herein would
indicate that the statute only affected the remedy, the Maine
Supreme Court nonetheless held the statute unconstitutional as
applied

to contracts executed

prior to

its effective date.

Federal Land Bank of Omaha v. Arnold, 426 N.W.2d 153 (Iowa 1988)
also dealt with a statutory modification

of the redemption

period and of other aspects of the foreclosure process.

The

statute was enacted in response to "the suffering and disloca5

tion which has wracked Iowa farm families in recent years."
N.W.2d

at

154.

legitimate and
Court

held

Although

the

Iowa

legislature

426

did have a

significant public purpose, the Iowa Supreme

that

the

statute

used

was

not

justifiable if applied to existing contracts.

constitutionally
See also Burke v.

E. L. C. Investors, Inc., 110 Wis.2d 406, 329 N.W.2d 259 (Ct.
App. 1982) (also holding unconstitutional a modification of the
statutory redemption period).
The cases cited by plaintiff as illustrating permissible
modifications

of

contracts

are

distinguishable.

Plaintiff

relies on Columbian Building and Loan Co. v. Meddles, 34 Ohio L.
Abs.

484, 35 N.E.2d

902

(1941), and on Whalen v. Citizens

Building and Loan Co. , 67 Ohio App. 139, 36 N.E.2d 54 (1940).
The statute at issue in those two cases was initially enacted in
1937, and subsequently amended in 1939, and provided for a twoyear limitation on the enforcement of deficiency judgments.

The

contracts at issue had been executed and foreclosed upon prior
to the enactment of the statutes.

The decisions of the Ohio

courts in Columbian and Whalen upheld the statute.

The deci-

sions can initially be explained as an exercise of police power,
because

the

statute

in

question

response to the Great Depression.

was

evidently

enacted

in

In addition, the enactment of

a statute of limitation on the enforcement of a deficiency
judgment is procedural, and does not affect substantive rights
to the same extent as the amendment at issue in the instant
case.
6
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In the past a public sale has been thought
to be the best method of enabling the
mortgagor to realize the fair value of his
premises.
However, when the realty market
is demoralized, that method of protecting
the rights of a mortgagor becomes a mere
formality.
It is then within the province
of the legislature, in order to prevent
injustice, to set up new machinery for the
enforcement of the obligation which will
safeguard the rights of the debtor and
secure to the creditor that which is his
due. No one has a vested substantive right
to more than is his due.
296 N.W.

"

The statute a*: issue in Guardian is further distinguishable
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and the debt.

As in Guardian, the Nevada Supr€»me Court upheld

the statute based on the principle that "mortgagees are constitutionally entitled to no more than payment in full.

They

cannot be heard to complain on constitutional grounds if the
legislature takes steps to see to it that they get no more than
that."

487 P.2d at 505 (quoting Gelfert v. National City Bank,

313 U.S. 221 (1941) (citations omitted)).
The 1985 amendment to Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-31 cannot
constitutionally be applied to contracts executed before the
statute.
basis,
rights.

The amendment cannot be justified on any public policy

and

it does

far more than merely

affect

procedural

The amendment has a significant substantive impact on

the amount which the debtor must pay to prevent foreclosure.
The trial court erred in denying Tanner's motion for summary
judgment and granting the motion of plaintiff.
POINT II
THE TRUST DEED INCORPORATED THE FORECLOSURE
PROVISIONS IN EFFECT WHEN IT WAS SIGNED.
Plaintiff argues that the 1985 amendment simply permitted
plaintiff to enforce the pervasive boiler plate provisions of
the contracts which purported to permit plaintiff to accelerate
the unpaid balance due upon default by the debtor.
is incomplete.

The analysis

In addition to providing that the beneficiary

under the Trust Deed has the right to accelerate the balance
due, the Trust Deed also provided, in paragraph 27, that the
beneficiary had the option to "foreclose this Trust Deed in the
8
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PLAINTIFFS NOVEMBER 30, 1987, LETTER DID
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;

-

if

t •: r e c l o s u r e .

Aihu/li
Tanner

language which
(Tanner's

initial

is

Mipf

established that the language is also consistent with a power of
sale foreclosure.

Brief of Appellants, Point III.)

The issue is not, however, whether the demand letter would
have permitted plaintiff to proceed by judicial foreclosure, but
rather whether it constituted such a clear election of remedies
as to have precluded plaintiff from proceeding with a power of
sale foreclosure.

The trust deed at issue and the applicable

statutes provide that a beneficiary under a de€>d of trust has
the option to foreclose by power of sale or to foreclose by
judicial action.
disadvantages.

Each method has its attendant advantages and
The

issue

in

the

present

case

is whether

plaintiff could claim the advantages of a judicial foreclosure
(or in other words, whether it could deprive Tanner of the
advantages

of

a

power

of

sale

accepting the disadvantages.
obligation.

foreclosure),

without

also

There must be a mutuality of

See Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch &

Livestock Company Inc., 706 P.2d 1028, 1036 (Utah 1985) (mutuality of obligations required for an enforceable contract).

If

any election of remedies effected by the demand letter was not
binding on plaintiff, it cannot have been binding and detrimental to defendants.
The November 30, 1987, demand letter did not constitute a
binding election of remedies.

An election of remedies occurs

only when there is (1) a choice between inconsistent remedies,
and (2) a party chooses one remedy in such a manner as to (3)
evidence

an

intent

to

forego

all
10

other

remedies.
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brief

that

the

consistent

with

I ••em assnmirn, arguendo, that the
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Eve1
<

;

*e

uefen-

dants had a right to cure the default by paying the delinquent
amounts at any time prior to the time plaintiff commenced its
action to judicially foreclose the Trust Deed.
POINT IV
RIDGE ATHLETIC CLUBS TENDER WAS ADEQUATE
AS A MATTER OF LAW.
Plaintiff challenges the validity of the tender of Ridge
Athletic Club made on December 7, 1987, on the ground that
neither the Club nor Darrell Tanner had cash in hand or in an
identifiable bank account on that date sufficient to pay the
amounts tendered.
otherwise.

The elements of a valid tender, however, are

The Club was not required to have cash in hand or in

any bank, but rather was only required to "have the ability to
produce it, and [to] act in good faith."
Utah 3, 36 P. 202, 203 (1894).

Hymas v. Bamberger, 10

The only evidence submitted to

the court in this case established that the Club did have the
ability to produce the tendered amount and did act in good
faith.
Darrell Tanner unequivocally testified by affidavit that
"on December 7, 1987, I had the ability to cause Ridge Athletic
Club, Inc., to pay the sum of $119,200.00 as indicated in the
tender."

(R. 382.)

In response to plaintiff's attempts to

challenge this statement, Darrell Tanner acknowledged that he
did not have that amount of cash in hand.

He also clearly

testified, however, that he could have obtained it from his
brother (Depo. of Darrell D. Tanner, p. 49, lines 10-11), from
12
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< *

Darrell Tanner could net ha v e :>rta;nei
^r . .cation --

*h*+-

T*.N

* ^ perform, as set

f

/idence and woul

-

ounsel

it--:, admissible

had

" *—" * .tied.

The only admissible e . v

*

r -

of the tender establishes 1- it Darrel . I inner nad tiie at^** . r*

c. : .
December
required
; .-

*

promised

- : j_ ^ -i: r -

produce

- •—.

a matter : ~
I

perform

tu*

:

- *

*\

r- ir/: ?n t \- Motio:

: .

- : un Uic record, this Court ::.«st hoi',
^

•> tender v

~~ rernative, if this Court concludes that the tender

i
an evidentiary hearing.

i idw, uiit; case must he
The testimony of Dai reII
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remanded for

very least creates an issue of fact as to whether he had the
ability to produce the money and tendered it in good faith.
POINT V
PLAINTIFF DID NOT HAVE A SECURITY INTEREST
IN NEW EQUIPMENT OF OTHER PERSONAL PROPERTY
ADDED BY TANNER OR THE RIDGE ATHLETIC CLUB, INC.
Plaintiff

asserts that

its security

interest

in after-

acquired property operates to give it a security interest in
personal property

(including equipment) placed on the subject

real property by Darrell D. Tanner
Athletic Club, Inc. ("Club").

("Tanner") or The Ridge

This contention must fail because

neither Tanner nor the Club signed a security agreement with
plaintiff (the Club in addition did not sign a guaranty or any
other document with plaintiff), and the personal property in
question was not a replacement of the prior collateral.
Plaintiff relies on three cases:

Inter Mountain Associa-

tion of Credit Men v. Villager. Inc., 527 P.2d 664 (Utah 1974);
Smiley v. Wheeler, 602 P.2d

209

(Okla. 1979) ? and American

Heritage Bank & Trust Co. v. 0. & E., Inc. , 40 Colo. App. 306,
576 P.2d 566 (1978).

Each is distinguishable because each case

dealt with after-acquired property which was a replacement of
the prior property, and the successor debtor was "related" to
the original debtor.

In Smiley, the creditor had a security

interest in equipment, which the successor debtor later replaced
with

new

concerned

equipment.

602

P. 2d

at 211.

American

Heritage

inventory, where the successor debtor mingled the

prior inventory with new inventory.
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576 P.2d at 567.

Villager

also

concerned

invf

. .

.?

inventory

which

i- ,\ iiMim

factor

replaced

prior

in the court's decision.

: Lij same logic wouid not apply to new equip-

: at

ment w h i c

essentially

-

added not as n replacement ot prior equipment,

but in -j;-.i-

-

-

*

ne liujj.

Properly read, Villager supports * • defendants' position
in this c a ^

':" original debtor

three other

*-:

. ,

assets were not subject
the origin-

-ci?-.-—

from, the ^ .

ir that

t.

case merged

••- 'at-on claimed its

secu:;t :

agreement executed •

Th«- 7oi;rr. hei i * e property

-

with

transferred

* • -• ' •f--t:nts subject to the

-

after-acquired property clause

:

.--cv.r.^y agreement.

The

creditor also claimed, however, that vne af*:e*-acquired property
clause operated

ii

. »• ii .1 M.'MU I I •„ int-ei-pst on all of the

property acquired by the successor corporati on, including that
former :y owned

by

C••:.:"

1

-- ecUni

property

clause

debtor and

the other

three

former corporations.

, ,

only

affected

The

alter-acquired
the

inventory

of

the

original

*: replacements.

1..: -*•: •-!--.-. property nt issue i ; i this » ase is p r e d o m i n a t e ly equipment added by the Club in connection with an expansion
of tn*

?' *

: ** addition, the Club replaced existing equipment

which *-*.

i' 111' I in 1 tif i inii pu i ch.iseii the property.

"new" equipment and other personal property
]

~*i±r-fc> security

security

agreement

interest
or

-

tinancn

>ur
*
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• .

This

subject to
as r*-t

signed

any

.inti ff.

Although the assets it purchased from Sherwood Associates are
subject
property

to plaintiff's
it

later

security interest.

security

purchased

interest, the new

is not

subject

to

personal

plaintiff's

See Q. T,, Inc. v. Thomas Russell & Co. ,

Inc. (In re Q. T.), 99 Bankr. 310 (Bankr. E. D. Va. 1989).
CONCLUSION
The 1985 amendments to Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-31 cannot
constitutionally be applied to this case.

Defendants had a

right to cure the default at the time that The Ridge Athletic
Club, Inc., tendered payment of the deficiency.
adequate as a matter of law.

The tender was

The case should be remanded with

instructions to grant Tanner's Motion for Summary Judgment.

In

the alternative, the case should be remanded for an evidentiary
hearing on the sufficiency of the tender.
DATED this 22nd day of January, 1990.

JACKSON HOWARD and
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Appellants
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